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INTRODUCTION
In September 2009, a lending division of American
International Group ("AIG") obtained a warrant for the arrest of
Jeffrey Stearns for failing to appear in court to defend a civil
lawsuit seeking payment for the remainder of the money owed
after AIG repossessed Stearns' pick-up truck.1 Stearns was
handcuffed in front of his four children and spent two nights in
jail until he agreed to pay AIG $1,500-the deficiency owed after
the auction of the vehicle. 2
Just a year prior, in 2008, AIG received amnesty when
American taxpayers provided the funds to pay AIG's outstanding
debts. 3 Neither federal courts nor state courts issued warrants for
the arrests of AIG's chairman of the board or any of AIG's
executives for failing to pay AIG's debts in a timely fashion. 4 No
members of the corporation experienced the humiliation of being
placed in handcuffs or sitting in jail until AIG paid its debts.
Instead, AIG executives received million dollar bonus packages.5
In the United States, despite the impossibility of corporate
existence without human agency, corporate and human persons
are regarded differently, and most importantly they are held to
dramatically different moral and ethical standards.6 Corporate
I Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors' Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487043965
04576204553811636610.html.
2 Id.
3 The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and
Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) ("On September 16, 2008, the Wall Street giant AIG
faced immediate bankruptcy. AIG was saved from collapse when the American people
came to the rescue with an $85 billion bailout. Less than 2 months later, the American
taxpayer was again forced to pay the bill when the Federal Reserve directed AIG to
hand out billions of dollars to counterparties that included the biggest names on Wall
Street."). See also NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF How WASHINGTON
ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 175-191 (2012); MAURICE R.
GREENBERG, THE AIG STORY (2013).
4 BAROFSKY, supra note 3, at 175 ("When providing the largest financial
institutions with bailout money, Treasury made almost no effort to hold them
accountable, and the bounteous terms delivered by the government seemed to border
on being corrupt. . . . Meanwhile, an entirely different set of rules applied for home
owners and businesses that were most assuredly small enough to fail.").
- Id. at 181-82.
6 Shahien Nasiripour, Don't Look Back: Major Players Continue To Walk Away'
From Poor Mortgages, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2010, 6:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/25/dont-look-back-major-play-n435965.html.
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persons are not expected to live by Calvinist virtues-specifically,
responsibility for their fiscal promises. A human person's financial
behavior, on the other hand, is infused with notions of personal
responsibility and Christianity. A human person's loan repayment
behavior is a reflection of individual character, while a corporate
person's loan repayment is a purely financial decision made
within the simplistically constructed context of changes in
economic conditions, available credit, and investor expectations. A
corporate person's failure is viewed as resulting from larger
aggregate economic factors, and the decision not to pay creditors is
often approved as "just good business" and "good economic sense."7
This difference is exemplified by media statements
concerning corporate and human persons' conduct during the
mortgage crisis. Individual homeowners with underwater
mortgages were counseled differently from similarly situated
corporate persons.8 Former Secretary of the Treasury (and former
chairman of the board of Goldman Sachs) Hank Paulson said that
"any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but
chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a
speculator-and one who is not honoring his obligations." 9 In
other words, the individual who walks away from an unprofitable
deal is reprimanded for the moral failing of not honoring his or her
obligations even though it might "make good economic sense." And
yet, this reprimand is not applied to corporate persons.
Investment firms Morgan Stanley and Tishman Speyer Properties
walked away from properties in San Francisco and New York City
that were billions of dollars underwater rather than continuing to
pay untenable mortgages because "it is better for the viability of
the entity and the profits for their shareholders."10 Mr. Paulson
7 Bob Adelmann, Donald Trump: The Art of Bankruptcy, THE NEW AM. (Apr. 22,
2011, 5:59 PM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/item/5764-donald-
trump-the-art-of-bankruptcy (Donald Trump explained to George Stephanopoulos, "I've
used the laws of this country to pare debt. . . . We'll have the company [that's in
financial trouble] . . . we'll throw it into a chapter [11 bankruptcy]. We'll negotiate with
the banks. We'll make a fantastic deal. You know, it's like on The Apprentice: It's not
personal. It's just business."). See also Nasiripour, supra note 6.





neither rebuked the investment firms nor disparaged the moral
character of their corporate officers and management team.
This Article considers the theory of disciplinary neo-
liberalism and how it is applied through manifestations of new
constitutionalism found in the recent Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 200511 ("BAPCPA")
amending the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. 12 The second Part discusses
the category of "person" from competing perspectives found in
Enlightenment thought and Roman law then analyzes the
unequal treatment of persons under the recent amendments and
Bankruptcy Code depending on whether it is a human person or a
fictive corporate person. Next, this Article describes the imbalance
in treatment of human and corporate persons evident in the
recent amendments. Specifically, BAPCPA introduced the means
test for only human debtors as a form of financial shackles. 13
Additionally, when a second petition is filed by a human debtor
within the same year, BAPCPA lifts the automatic stay-the
bankruptcy shield-protecting human debtors from their
creditors' collection activities. Finally, human debtors are stripped
of protections and powers under BAPCPA, whereas corporate
debtors are not subject to these new amendments and are granted
new statutory powers.
I. DISCIPLINING NEOLIBERALISM, NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM,
AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
In the U.S., the concept of corporate personhood has evolved
over the last forty years to encompass increased legal rights and
protections for corporate persons. 14 During the same time, the
rights and protections for human persons have been attacked on
11 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (2006)). Most provisions of the Act became effective Oct. 17, 2005.
12 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
Referred to as the "1978 Bankruptcy Code."
13 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006). See also 11 U.S.C. app. B22A, B22C.
14 See generally THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: How CORPORATIONS
BECAME "PEOPLE"-AND How You CAN FIGHT BACK (2d ed. 2010); JEFFREY D.
CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE: WHY THEY HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN
You Do AND WHAT YOU CAN Do ABOUT IT (2012). The development of the fictive person
is discussed in Part II of this paper.
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several fronts, 15 including that of debt relations. This change
reflects the larger shift in structures and processes of capitalism
toward neoliberal policies and practices.16 These policies and
practices are premised on a market fundamentalism discourse.' 7
15 Robert Weissman, Corporate Rights in South Africa, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR,
(Nov. 1996), available at http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm1196.03.html
('The extension to corporations of freedom of political expression, negative free speech
rights and rights of privacy has undermined the constitutional rights of natural
persons to freedom of expression, freedom of association in organs of civil society,
access to information, the rights to life, security of person and a safe environment.").
16 "Neoliberal" and "neoliberalism" are used in this Article as tools applied to
analyze a national trend in political and economic practices. This national trend has
homologous international structures. Fashioned in Washington D.C. in 1989 as a set of
policies and practices for Latin America, neoliberal notions find root in the
"Washington Consensus" formulated by John Williamson. Initially, the policy and
practices were drafted as "reforms" Latin America must adopt to escape the debt crisis.
They include fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform,
liberalization of interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization,
liberalization of inward foreign investment, privatization, deregulation, and property
rights. See Ravi Kanbur, The Co-Evolution of the Washington Consensus and the
Economic Development Discourse, 24 MACALESTER INT'L 33, 35 (2009). For a theoretical
understanding of "neoliberalism" see Dag Einar Thorsen, The Neoliberal Challenge:
What is Neoliberalism?, 2(2) CONTEMP. READINGS IN L. & SOC. JUST. 188 (2010).
Professor Thorsen clarifies the meaning of the term "neoliberalism" by explaining that
it is similar to and yet different from traditional liberalism as a political ideology (as
found in the works of John Locke, Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Thomas Jefferson, John
Stuart Mills, and others). Liberalism, according to Thorsen, is broadly defined as a
political ideology tending to favor constitutional changes that lean in the direction of
freedom and democracy. Neoliberalism can be seen as a descendant or offshoot from
liberalism, and yet, it is still very different from it. Neoliberalism aligns with economic
liberalism or classic liberalism rather than with a social or modern liberalism.
Neoliberalism, in the various forms identified by Thorsen, is a loosely demarcated set
of political beliefs that hold the conviction that the only function of "the state is to
safeguard individual liberty, understood as a sort of mercantile liberty for individuals
and corporations." Id. at 203. Within this, a system of unregulated free markets with
free trade should be implemented. Unregulated markets with a finely tuned logic are
thought to "set free the creative potential and the entrepreneurial spirit . . . and
thereby lead to more individual liberty and well-being, a more efficient allocation of
resources . . . ." Id. at 204. See also Linda Coco, Debtor's Prison in the Neoliberal State:
"Debtfare" and the Cultural Logics of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2012).
17 Stuart Hall, Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse, in DISCOURSE THEORY
AND PRACTICE: A READER 72, 72 (Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, & Simeon J.
Yates eds., 2001) ("Discourse" is a word adopted from the work of Michel Foucault
meaning, "a group of statements which provide a language for talking about-a way of
representing the knowledge about-a particular topic at a particular historical
moment.... Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But ...
since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and influence what we
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
This discursive form includes notions and values such as:
capitalism is economically efficient; accumulation of material and
money is desirable; public "resources" should be privatized; self-
regulating markets are necessary and government should protect
that freedom; and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few
elite classes is not problematic.18 The cost to human populations is
not considered.
National and local governments work, therefore, in
furtherance of neoliberal policies by ensuring market
fundamentalism through "rule of law" frameworks that promote a
market order of liberalization, encourage private sector
investment, and protect large corporations as the primary agents
of global and local governance.19 Rule of law frameworks contain
juridical formations of "new-constitutionalism" that involve
"intensified efforts to extend, deepen and lock-in neoliberal
governance and with it greater legal guarantees for private
property rights and the protection of the sanctity of contract
against encroachment." 20 Private property rights are held by a
small number of individuals and institutions in society, and those
rights impose related duties on other non-propertied members of
society. 21 Members of civil society are disciplined by the processes
of wealth accumulation. This creates a forum for disciplining
neoliberalism, in that state agencies and powers are used to
further implement a neoliberal agenda and worldview.
The concept of disciplining neoliberalism developed by
political scientist Stephen Gill draws together the macro and
micro levels of structural and behavioral power as the primary
forces controlling populations within the United States' and other
do-our conduct-all practices have a discursive aspect. . . . It is about language and
practice.... It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way
that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences
how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others. Just as a
discourse 'rules in' certain ways . . . to talk, write, or conduct oneself, so also, by
definition, it 'rules out', limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting
ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it.").
18 STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 123-49
(2008).
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Western countries' political and economic orders. 22 Disciplining
neo-liberalism, as Professor Gill describes, combines the
"structural power of capital with 'capillary power' and
'panopticism"' that are "bureaucratized and institutionalized . . .
across a range of public and private spheres in various state and
civil society complexes." 23 These state practices create a frame of
understanding constituting a "terrain of knowledge and a system
of social and individual control." 24
According to Stephen Gill and Isabella Bakker, the concepts
of new constitutionalism and disciplining neoliberalism describe
the process for implementing a worldwide revolution-neoliberal
governance-by doing "nothing less than the reconfiguration of
forms of state and power/production/social reproduction along
largely liberal lines in ways designed to empower private property
associated with capital . . . ."25 The mechanisms of this new
configuration include "new networks of laws, rules, [and]
standards."26 These new networks of laws, rules, and standards
are what constitute the market "enabling state" that is committed
to locking in reforms for citizens.27 Central to the security of
capital is the state's reformulations of new constitutionalism to
lock in fiscal austerity for particular classes and corporate
entities. 28
BAPCPA is an example of a legal mechanism of disciplining
neo-liberalism. The amendments to the 1978 Code increase
protections for the rights of private property holders and further
ensure the sanctity of contracts between particular persons. 29 The
Amendment's impacts are uneven depending on debtor status as
either a natural or a fictive person. For example, the 2005 act
maintains and extends the protectionist provisions for corporate
22 Id. at 137.
23 Id. at 137-38.
24 Id. at 137.
25 Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill, Ontology, Method, and Hypotheses, in POWER,
PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION: HUMAN IN/SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 17, 29 (Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill eds., (2003).
26 Id. at 30.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 30-35.
29 See generally id. at 31.
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persons. 30 Human persons, on the other hand, experience
heightened financial scrutiny.
Studied holistically, BAPCPA creates an asymmetric
treatment of debtors depending on their categorization as human
person or corporate person.31 The unequal treatment of
categorically different debtors is strikingly apparent as new
subsections are considered in relation to other provisions. 32 A
holistic reading with cross-referencing of words and phrases
reveals a disproportionate and overly-broad detrimental impact on
human debtors as compared with corporate debtors. In light of
this unequal treatment of debtors under BAPCPA, scholars have
reflected on whether such an impact is purposeful 33 or simply a
result of haphazard and sloppy drafting. 34 Others have argued
that such a disproportionate impact is by design. 35 Regardless of
the position taken, these shifts manifest a disposition to protect
private capital at the expense of individuals. 36
30 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (2006)). Most provisions of the Act became effective Oct. 17, 2005.
3 11 U.S.C. § 101 (41) (2006) ("The term 'person' includes individual, partnership,
and corporation, but does not include governmental unit, except that a governmental
unit... .").
32 See infra Part III.
33 Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 377-79 (2007) (The new Act, rather than achieving its stated
purpose of catching can pay debtors, actually works to benefit issuers of revolving
credit loans with high interest rates by keeping individuals in need outside the
bankruptcy system, in the sweat box.).
34 Peter E. Meltzer, Won't You Stay a Little Longer? Rejecting the Majority
Interpretation of Bankruptcy Code Section 362(c)(3)(A), 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 407, 414-
420. (2012) (The article provides ample citations for post-BAPCPA negative
commentary.).
35 See Linda Coco, Debtor's Prison in the Neoliberal State: "Debtfare" and the
Cultural Logics of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2012).
36 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 5-38 (2005); JEFF MADRICK,
AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE
PRESENT 5 (2011) (This text discusses the social and political impacts of anti-New Deal
activists who began to gain power in the 1970s. "The believers eventually found a
unifying voice for their philosophy in the economic writings of Milton Friedman and the
novels of Ayn Rand. They found their national political leadership in Ronald Reagan.
They found powerful allies in big business, who were relative latecomers to their cause,
learning in the 1970s to organize themselves politically for fear the progressive country
was turning against them.").
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II. THE CATEGORY OF "PERSON"
Cultural notions such as beliefs, values, and ideals are
predisposed to function as dominant notions or formative
structures on the larger collectively-held cognitive map. 3 7
According to anthropologist Franz Boas, in order to understand a
culture's cognitive map and categories of thought, one must first
examine its histories to contextualize its adaptability and
meaning to cultural practices. 38 French social theorist Pierre
Bourdieu has similarly theorized that, as a cultural notion,
''persons" are culturally constructed and socially determined
according to a particular cultural cognitive map or structure. 39 In
Western culture and economy, "person," human and corporate, is a
socially salient category, and the dominant notions that shape the
category of a person find root in the history and practices of the
American free market capitalist system. 40 These culturally
constructed categories of natural or corporate persons are then
used in a cultural context and discourse.
In sociological scholarship, the notion of personhood often
begins with a discussion of a "person" in society and within a
social collective. In sociological and anthropological discourse,
person and personhood are a distinct identity with discernible
boundaries (i.e., an individual or entity). The person
simultaneously exists in relation and reaction to the world while
also being shaped by the social world. As Bourdieu writes, "[t]he
idea of a separate individual is based . . . on the naive
apprehension of what . . . is perceived from outside. . . . Nothing is
more familiar to us than the impression that man is an individual
living being among others and that the skin is his boundary . . .
3 PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 72 (Richard Nice trans.,
1977).
38 GEORGE STOCKING, THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY 1883-1911
(George W. Stocking, Jr. ed., 1974).
3 PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 106 (John B. Thompson
ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991); BOURDIEU, supra note 37at 85-
86.
40 Leslie C. Aiello & James F. Brooks, Corporate Lives: New Perspectives on the
Social Life of the Corporate Form: Wenner-Gren Symposium Supplement 3, 52 Current
Anthropology S3 (2011); See also SUSANNE SOEDERBERG, CORPORATE POWER AND




."41 Bourdieu describes this vision of society as a form of
personalism and a personalist belief in the unique person. 42
Personhood, therefore, is socially constructed as a unique
constitution or composition of attributes in one body.43 These
characteristics and beliefs create a separate body of a person
distinct from the social collective body discernible according to the
collectively held cultural cognitive map. 4 4
In Western society, the category of a distinct "person" and a
notion of personhood primarily have philosophical and legal
origins.45 The notion of a person with innate human rights is
largely a creation of Enlightenment thought found in the writings
of John Locke 46 and Immanuel Kant.47 These rights theorists were
responding to the dominant ideas of Medieval times found in the
theistic monarchies that legitimized social order through
testaments of God's will and the great chain of being. According to
that dominant view, all individual humans were connected to the
sovereign as subjects. Within this framework, a human person is
part of the great chain of being and the biological human body did
not constitute a separate social unit. In contrast to these Medieval
notions, Locke proposed that the basic unit of society was a
collection of individual humans, and not God, and that social order
was created by agreement of those individuals.
Locke writes in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
that "we must consider what [a] person stands for . . . [it] is a
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times
and places . . . ."48 Locke's view of personhood emphasizes self-
consciousness, thought, and memory. A person in Locke's writings
is a thinking, intelligent being that has the ability to reason,
engage in rational thought, and reflect. A person, therefore, can
41 PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 131 (Richard Nice trans., 2000).
42 Id. at 132.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, in 16 AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 207 (Nicholas Rescher ed., 1979).
46 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (originally published
in 1690), available at ftp://ftp.dca.fee.unicamp.br/pub/docs/ia005/humanund.pdf.
4 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Marcus Weigelt ed.,
trans., 2007).
48 Locke, supra note 46, at 318.
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consider herself as herself. A person, because of memory, is a
collection of beliefs, capacities, capabilities, and dispositions that,
for the most part, remain consistent in different places and times.
Kant added to this notion of personhood the idea that a person is a
thinking and reasoning individual who is a holder of legally
recognized rights. Due to these features, a person, in the
Enlightenment human rights tradition, has a biological, human
anchor.
In Latin, "person" has its roots in the Latin word persona,
"meaning among other things, a theatrical role." 49 A person has
only two dimensions from this perspective. Under Roman law, the
term "person" referred to "anything that could act on either side of
a legal dispute."50 Roman law developed an idea of personhood as
any entity possessing rights and duties in legal disputes.51
"Person" is connected to the idea of an identity or outward
expression of juridical traits.52 The biological anchor of a person is
irrelevant to both Latin and Roman legal notions.53 A person is a
creation of form rather than content. Under Roman law, a person
is simply an artifact of legal processes, statutory enactments, and
judicial opinions.54
The Oxford English Dictionary ("OED") illustrates these two
primary ways of thinking about persons in its definition of
'person.' In subparts 1-5 of the definition, a person is discussed as
an individual anchored to a biological body with capacities and
capabilities and as possessing a coherency.55 In these definitions, a
person is not a robot, chimpanzee, or legal entity. The individual
person is not a free-floating and inconsistent entity without form.
In definition 6, the OED adopts the Roman law characteristics of
"person" stating, "[1]aw . . . [person is a] body corporate or
corporation (artificial person) having rights . . . recognized by the
49 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 962
(1982); see also French, supra note 45, at 208.





55 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 724 (1971)
("Persons: 2. An individual human being; a man, woman or child .... as distinguished
from a thing, or from the lower animals . . . . 3. A self-conscious or rational being . . .. 4.
The living body of a human being.. . .").
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law."56 Providing an example from a 1765 text, the OED quotes as
follows: "artificial [persons] are such as are created and devised by
human laws for the purposes of society and government . . . ."57
The corporation is a fictive, rhetorical manifestation, a
fundamental economic unit, created by and for economic society.
The U.S. Supreme Court gave this rhetorical manifestation,
the corporate person, human rights and protections under the
Constitution.5 8 Since 1886, the Court has invoked the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses under the 14th Amendment59 to
protect corporate persons from the power of individual states.60 A
line of Supreme Court cases proclaims that a state could not
deprive a corporate person of property without the same
protections afforded a human person.61 Under these cases
spanning from 1886 to the recent Citizens United62 opinion, a
corporate person can successfully challenge the validity of any
56 Id. The definition of "person."
51 Id. The definition of "person."
5s CLEMENTS, supra note 14, at 65.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
6o Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (This Supreme Court
case is most often inaccurately cited as holding that "corporations are persons" for
purposes of the 14th Amendment. This is a citation of the head note to the case written
by the Supreme Court reporter stating "One of the points made and discussed at length
in the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that 'Corporations are persons within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States'
[b]efore argument."). This was not the holding of the Court. The Court held only on a
state law issue. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 26-29.
61 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181
(1888); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888); Minneapolis & St. Louis
Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U.S. 210 (1888); Charlotte C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S.
386 (1892); Covington and L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896);
Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
62 Daniel Lipton, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: Defining Corporate
Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1955-56 (2010).
The article discusses the impact of the recent opinion extending First Amendment
protections to corporations, and how this opinion reaffirms the corporation as a fictive
person in American law. Id.
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state action adversely affecting its Constitutional rights.63 State
and federal legislatures also adopt the Roman law definition of a
"person." State and federalstatutes often define "person" as
including individuals and corporations. 64 In these laws, corporate
persons have rights and duties distinct from the rights and duties
of human persons.
It is through legal fiat that an entity without a body, that
does not directly act, speak, or think has expansive legal
protections and rights. A corporate person is able to invoke the
protections of the judicial system similar to a human person.
Court opinions and statutory law recognize the freedom of
corporate persons to hold and manage private property and to
engage in private contracts as any human person. The
constitutionally protected right to property and private contract
are most apparent in the legal structures and practices controlling
insolvency, financial failure, and bankruptcy. Depending on
whether a debtor is a corporate person or a human person, the
legal structures mediating debt relations take on distinct
characteristics practically and symbolically.
63 Howard Jay Graham, An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate
"Person", 2 UCLA L. REV., 155, 163-64 (1955). This article explains that the holdings in
the corporate person line of cases are tantamount to two constitutional amendments: 1.
"Corporations are free to challenge any governmental action opposed to their
interests." 2. "The Supreme Court is empowered to review all governmental action-
State and Federal-pertaining to corporations and to veto any such action deemed
arbitrary or unreasonable." Id.
6 E.g., Cal. Vehicle Code § 470 (West 2012) ('Person' includes a natural person,
firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation."); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2011) ("The term 'person' means an individual,
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."); Mike Masnick, Activist Tells Court that
Since Corporations Are People, He Can Drive In The Carpool Lane With Incorporation
Papers, TECHDIRT (Jan. 14, 2013, 2:15 PM) http://www.techdirt.com/blog
/?tag-carpool+lane (last visited on Jan. 21, 2013). This is a recent California case in
which an HOV lane driver cited the California Vehicle Code § 470 as stating that
"person" includes "a natural person, firm, corporation." Id. The defendant cited the code
section as a defense to an HOV lane traffic violation. The defendant explained that he
had the papers establishing incorporation and corporate personhood in his vehicle,
therefore, two persons were in the vehicle as required by the HOV law. The court
agreed with defendant's statutory interpretation, but still found the defendant guilty
by citing statutory intent. Id.
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III. BANKRUPTCY, BAPCPA, AND "PERSONS"
Under the Bankruptcy Code, an eligible "person" can file a
bankruptcy petition invoking the protections and relief of the
bankruptcy court.65 Although the Bankruptcy Code defines
"person" as both an "individual . . . and corporation,"66 the Code
gives a corporate person significantly more powers and protections
and places more burdens and duties on a human debtor. The
asymmetric treatment of corporate persons and human persons
has never been more apparent than it is in BAPCPA, which
addresses debtor abuse of the bankruptcy laws and in the
bankruptcy process.
Although corporate persons engage in similar behavior in
debt relationships and bankruptcy as human persons, their
behavior is not labeled as abuse. First, a corporate debtor has no
pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement to ensure it has
tried other non-bankruptcy options to pay its creditors. Second, a
corporate debtor's accounts receivable is not scrutinized under a
means test to determine whether it is barred from immediate
relief under Chapter 7, or whether it should be forced into a five
year repayment plan with its excess income.
Repeated filings of bankruptcy petitions by a corporate debtor
do not result in an elimination of protections of the automatic stay
as such behavior does for human debtors. Finally, under BAPCPA,
the corporate debtor's powerful bankruptcy sword used to
bifurcate or "strip down" secured debts into secured and
unsecured portions based on actual value is unaffected. Human
debtors, on the other hand, are now subject to set time frames
6 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2006).
66 Id. § 101(9) "The term 'Corporation'-(A) includes-(i) association having a
power or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership,
possesses; (ii) partnership association organized under a law that makes only the
capital subscribed responsible for the debts of such association; (iii) joint-stock
company; (iv) unincorporated company or association; or (v) business trust; but (B) does
not include limited partnership." Id. Note: a corporate person is broadly defined under
the Code to include many types of legal forms. Individual person is left undefined by
the Code but is read by the bankruptcy courts with its natural language meaning a
"human being." When a term or phrase is left undefined by a statute, the Supreme
Court instructs that such a term or phrase is given its natural language meaning. See
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511 (2008).
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post-filing within which they are prevented from bifurcating an
obligation and listing it separately on the schedules.
A. BAPCPA Shackles: Credit Counseling, Means Testing, and
Financial Management Instructional Courses
Under the headings of "Needs-Based Bankruptcy" and
"Discouraging Bankruptcy Abuse," 67 the recent amendments cast
the human debtor into financial shackles with the enactment of
several provisions scrutinizing human debtor finances: the "means
test" determining availability of Chapter 7 protections and pre-
filing credit counseling for bankruptcy debtor status eligibility.
The means test removes the presumption of good faith favoring a
discharge of individual debt and replaces it with a presumption of
abuse that must be overcome to receive a discharge.68 Not
surprisingly, corporate debtors are exempt from the means test
and are not denied a complete discharge in a Chapter 7 relief
based on an income to expense analysis. 69
1. The Means Test
After BAPCPA's passage and enactment, several questions
arose concerning the application of a significant section of the act
known as the "means test."70 Human persons under the Code are
subject to in-depth financial scrutiny to which corporate persons
are immune. Most significantly, BAPCPA substituted this new
test for the 1978 Code's presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by a human debtor.71 A human debtor, not a corporate
67 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, Titles I & III (2005).
68 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 13 (2005); reprinted in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
69 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006) (Applies to debtors with "primarily consumer
debts.").
70 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. app. Official Forms B22A and B22C.
7 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006).
[Tihe court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee,
trustee. . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this
chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts . . . if it finds that the
granting of relief would be [a substantial] abuse of the provisions of this
chapter.
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debtor, must now pass an abuse test, the means test, to receive a
discharge of his or her debts. 72
The Means Test is a codification of a previous informal test
applied by the U.S. Trustee's Office in the Department of
Justice. 73 The former informal test focused on the debtor's ability
Id. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
Post-BAPCPA, § 707(b)(1) changes "substantial abuse" to simply "an abuse." And
BAPCPA removes the presumption. Id.
72 After the enactment of the 2005 Act, significant questions arose as to the
imposition and enforcement of this new 'means test' section. The bankruptcy judges
and their law clerks needed to create clear procedural guidelines and practices for the
enforcement of the new Act. During my field work, a judge asked me to write a memo
with recent case law discussing the application of the 'means test' to debtors. Our
conversation according to my notes:
Bankruptcy judge: Linda, I have reviewed the memo you wrote on the new
means test. I have a question regarding the Al Auto Parts Chapter 7 case.
Does the Code require the debtor in that case to perform the means [test]
before filing?
Linda Coco: No, judge. The debtor in that case is a business. The new Code
requiring the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 debtor's case when the debtor does
not perform the 'means test' or the debtor fails the repayment test only
applies when the debtor is a human individual.
BJ: An individual, not a person.
LC: An individual under the Bankruptcy Code is defined as a natural person,
not a legal person such as a company or corporation. The Bankruptcy Code
includes companies and corporations within the meaning of a person, but not
within the meaning of an individual. This classification of the company as a
person allows such legal entities to file a bankruptcy petition. However, the
'means test' section states that it applies only to "an individual debtor under
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts."
BJ So, a company or a business debtor need not perform the 'means test'
before filing and need not determine whether it can pay a portion of debts,
and such a debtor is not required to repay its creditors if it can stay in
business and pay.
LC: That is correct.
BJ: (Pause) Wow, companies are treated differently in bankruptcy. Huh, I
had not thought of that before.
73 Prior to passage of the 2005 Amendments, the United States Trustee's Officer
(UST) performed an analysis informally that considered a debtor's disposable income
over a period of 36 months. The total amount of disposable income is used to determine
the percentage of unsecured debts a debtor could pay. If a debtor could pay more than
35% of his or her unsecured debts, the UST filed a motion to dismiss under the 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) substantial abuse provision. The decision to perform this test and
file a motion to dismiss is informal, because it was made on a case-by-case basis and
required a judge order. It was not an automatic statutory formula.
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to repay his debts based on his excess income after deducting
expenses. The informal test involved a calculation of the debtor's
total debt in relation to the debtor's income over a three to five
year period. If the debtor could pay 30% or greater of the
outstanding total debt over a five year period, the U.S. Trustee's
Office would ask the bankruptcy court to require the debtor to
repay his or her creditors in a Chapter 13 repayment plan. If the
court determined that the debtor had the means to repay his or
her creditors, then the debtor would be required to do so through a
Chapter 13 repayment plan or the court would dismiss the
bankruptcy petition and thus deny the human debtor the
protections of bankruptcy law.
BAPCPA codified the previously informal practice, making
the means test a required calculation for all consumer debtors.74
Before the human debtor files a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 petition,
the individual must calculate his income based on national
standards, and he must consider whether he can repay a small
portion of his total debt.75 BAPCPA mandates presume that the
human debtor is a bad actor until he or she proves the inability to
pay $11,075 over 60 months from disposable income; if the
possible repayment amount is less, then the human debtor must
show an inability to pay 25% of his or her outstanding unsecured
debts.76 If the human debtor fails this test, BAPCPA mandates
dismissal for abuse of Chapter 7 by a debtor who can pay.7 7 If the
debtor remains in bankruptcy, BAPCPA forces the debtor to pay
creditors a portion of the debtor's income and live on a bread and
water diet under a five year repayment plan in Chapter 13.78
Under the means test, human debtors are permitted a small
living expense allowance with explicit statutory caps. 79 The
Collection Financial Standards of the Internal Revenue Service
-' 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006). This section applies only to debtors with primarily
consumer debts.
71 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. app. Official Form B22A.
76 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).
77 Id. (replacing the phrase "substantial abuse" under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
with "abuse", indicating that to allow the debtor to file a chapter 7 petition, the debtor
now needs to show that a filing of a bankruptcy petition is not simply an "abuse" and
revealing that the presumption of honesty has switched to a presumption of
dishonesty).
78 Id. § 1325(b). See also Official Form B22C.
79 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2006). See also Official Form B22 CB22C.
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("IRS") set the debtor's permissible food, clothing, and shelter
expenses.80 These standards found in the Internal Revenue
Manual ("Manual") delineate the allowed living expense standards
for delinquent taxpayers and income tax evaders.8' The Manual
allows tax evaders only those expenses that are deemed
''necessary to provide for a taxpayer's and his or her family's
health and welfare andlor production of income."82 The expenses
are deducted from the human debtor's "current monthly income" 83
to arrive at the debtor's "projected disposable income." 84 The
"disposable income" is paid to the unsecured creditors pursuant to
the five-year plan.85
For example, a family of four living in Seminole County,





Personal Care Products $76.00
Car Ownership Allowance $517.00
Utilities $613.0086
All income remaining after subtracting these expenses is
considered disposable income and must be paid into a Chapter 13
s 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
s1 Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), Part 5: Collecting Process: Chapter 15. Section
1-Financial Analysis Handbook, available at http://www.irs.gov/irmlpart5/irm_05-
015-001.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
82 Id. at 5.15.1.7. Allowable Expense Overview.
8 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2470 (2010) (explaining 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b)(2) (2006)). See also 11 U.S.C. § 101 at (10A) (defining "current monthly
income").
* 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006).
85 Id. § 1325(b)(4).
8 Census Bureau, IRS Data and Administrative Expenses Multipliers,
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eolbapcpa/20121101/meanstesting.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2014); IRS National Standards: Food, Clothing and Other Expenses,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/National-Standards-
Food-Clothing-and-Other-Items (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
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plan.8 7 These allowances give the human debtor the bare
minimum to live.8 8 Meant originally as retribution for tax evaders,
these limits on expenses act as a punishment for individuals who
are facing difficult financial circumstances.
A human person, unlike a corporate person, who files a
petition under Chapter 1189 rather than Chapter 13 remains
subject to the mandates of BAPCPA's means test to confirm a
Chapter 11 plan.90 The drafters of BAPCPA ensured that a human
person who files a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 is
uniformly subject to an income and expenses analysis to
determine whether he or she has an ability to pay a portion of his
or her debts. BAPCPA "engrafts onto chapter 11 chapter 13-like
provisions that bring into the estate a consumer debtor's future
wages based on the new 'means test."'91
Corporate persons filing either a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11
petition are not subject to a comparable screening test of their
debts and ability to pay as they pass through the bankruptcy
process.92 In fact, when a corporate person files a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition through its shareholders and officers, its
87 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006) (providing strict formula for debt-paying ability).
88 IRM, supra note 81.
89 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006). An individual who exceeds the debt limits is ineligible
to file a Chapter 13 petition. Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 are the only remaining options
when an individual is ineligible. See id.
9o Id. § 1129(a)(15).
In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which the holder of an
allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan-
(A) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim; or
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less than
the projected disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section
1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period beginning on the date that
the first payment is due under the plan, or during the period for which the
plan provides payments, whichever is longer.
Id.
9 G. Ray Warner, Garnishment Restrictions and the Involuntary Chapter 11:
Rethinking Kokoszak in a Means Test World, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 733, 735
(2005)
92 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006) (Corporate persons are only eligible for a Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 petition filing. Section 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13 is
reserved for "individuals with regular income.").
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managing body remains intact. The managing structure continues
to manage the debtor as the debtor-in-possession ("DIP"). The DIP
has all the powers of a trustee. 93 As the DIP, the corporate debtor
retains decision-making authority, remains in possession of all
corporate assets,94 and is only subject to the "business judgment"
rule.9 5 Contrary to the means test, the business judgment rule
ensures that the corporate debtor has great discretion in day-to-
day operations and full authority to make business decisions.
a. Pre-Petition Credit Briefing/Counseling
BAPCPA section 106(a) added to the Bankruptcy Code a
"credit briefing" condition for eligibility in filings involving human
debtors, but excludes corporate debtors.96 The human debtor is
required in the six month period before filing a bankruptcy
petition to receive "from an approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency . . . an individual or group briefing . . . that
outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling . . . ."97
This section is interpreted to require that the debtor receive
"credit counseling,"98 obtain a certificate of counseling, and file the
certificate with the bankruptcy petition. 99 The case will be
93 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012) ("Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a
case under this chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a
debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation
under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and
duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2),(3), and (4) of this title, of a
trustee serving in a case under this chapter.").
94 Id.
95 Prod. Res. Grp., LLC v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788. n.52 (Del. Ch. 2004)
("[T]he business judgment rule remains [an] important [corporate tool in bankruptcy]
and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith, prudent
judgments about the risks they should undertake on behalf of troubled firms."). The
business judgment rule protects the corporate directors and officers from
responsibility and liability due to decisions that impact the restructuring corporation.
See id.
96 Allan N. Resnick, Henry J. Sommer, & Lawrence P. King. Collier Pamphlet
Edition. Part 1: Bankruptcy Code. Lexis Nexis (2008 version providing the redactions
and additions of BAPCPA) p. 132; Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, Title I, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37
(2005).
97 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1).
9 Resnick et a]., supra note 96, at 132.
9 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1).
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dismissed either automatically or by a motion filed by the U.S.
Trustee if the certificate is not filed with the petitions.
The credit briefing requirement was included in BAPCPA as
a pre-bankruptcy requirement for a human debtor, not a corporate
debtor, to review his or her income and expenses to determine if
the debts can be paid.100 The requirement is intended to guide a
human debtor away from filing a bankruptcy petition.10t If a
debtor fails to obtain counseling and file the certificate with the
bankruptcy court at the time of filing, the debtor's case is
automatically dismissed. 102 Upon case dismissal, section 302 of
BAPCPA is invoked.
B. Bankruptcy Shields and BAPCPA: The Automatic Stay
The moment a bankruptcy petition is filed in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court an automatic stay is activated. 103 As an
element of the fresh start, the stay prevents creditors from taking
further collection, foreclosure, or repossession actions against the
debtor or any of the debtor's property. 104 The automatic stay is
fundamental to the bankruptcy process under all chapters-
100 First Shore Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudson, 352 B.R. 391, 392-93 (Bankr. D.
Md. 2006) (applying section 109(h)(1)). See also Resnick et al., supra note 96, at 132.
1o1 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (stating that "[A]n individual may not be a debtor under
this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day period [preceding] the date of
filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget
and credit counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing
... that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling"); see also First Shore
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 352 B.R. at 394-95 (interpreting the new provision requiring
debtors to obtain a credit briefing in the 180-day period preceding the date of filing).
102 In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 700-09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (addressing the
consequences of a section 109(h) dismissal of the debtor's petition and the impact of
that dismissal on the debtor's subsequent filing, and explaining that such a dismissal
results in a limitation on the automatic stay).
103 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities .... ).
104 Id. § 362(a)(1)-(8); see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 95-
595, at 174 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6135 (1978) ("For the
consumer, the stay ceases all harassment by bill collectors; for the ailing business, the
stay gives the business a breathing spell and time to work constructively with its
creditors, or in the case of a liquidation, prevents some creditors from obtaining
preferential treatment by quick action.").
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liquidations, reorganizations, and repayment plan cases. 05 The
automatic stay provides the indebted individual or corporation a
cessation of creditors' collection activities. 06 This cessation
maintains the status quo and gives a debtor time to develop a
financial plan.107 It also preserves the debtor's assets for all
creditors from the collection actions of any individual creditor. 08
The Bankruptcy Code provides greater protective shields for
corporate debtors under the automatic stay than human debtors.
Corporate persons are not subject to the new repeat file provisions
resulting in automatic termination of the automatic stay.
At the moment of filing, a bankruptcy estate is created that
contains all of the debtor's interests in property.109 According to
the 1978 Code, the estate property is protected by the stay
through the pendency of the case or until lifted by the bankruptcy
court.110 BAPCPA altered the application of this automatic stay
for property of the debtor and for property of the estate for cases
involving human persons. The automatic application of the stay
created by the 1978 Code is distorted into an automatic
termination of stay instead. 111 Under BAPCPA, there are several
circumstances in which the automatic stay will not apply to a
human debtor or will be limited or terminated upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.
First, BAPCPA section 302 significantly changes the 1978
Code subsections by adding sections 362(c)(3) and 362(c)(4) with a
rebuttable presumption of bad faith for successive filings by a
105 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97. The stay stems from the
fact that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity with in rem jurisdiction over the
debtor's assets. See Kimberly Lehnert, Termination of the Stay for Successive Filers:
Interpreting § 362(c)(3), 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 243, 247. (2012).
106 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595 ("[JInterests in property the
debtor has at the commencement of the case. This includes all interests, such as
interests in real or personal property, tangible and intangible property . . . choses in
action, rights such as copyrights, trade-marks, patents, . . . contingent interests, and
future interests.").
1o 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1)-(2); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97.
"I1 See generally Lisa A. Napoli, The Not-So-Automatic Stay: Legislative Changes to
the Automatic Stay in a Case Filed by or Against an Individual Debtor, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 749 (2005).
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human debtor.112 These provisions limit and deny the automatic
stay with respect to individual human debtors who had one or
more cases pending before the bankruptcy court in the previous
year. Repeat bankruptcy petition filings are a significant problem
with corporate persons in Chapter 11.113 Consider the well-known
two-timers over the last two decades: Interstate Bakeries (a.k.a
Hostess Brands),114 Trans World Airlines,115 Trump Hotels &
Casino Resorts,116 U.S. Airways Group,117 and Montgomery
Ward.118 Notwithstanding the fact that repeat filings by corporate
debtors is a significant issue, BAPCPA section 302 only applies to
human debtors. 119
Section 362(c)(3) applies to "an individual" who files a
bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7, 11, or 13 who had a case
pending before the bankruptcy court in the preceding year in any
chapter. If a debtor has had a pending case, and that case was not
dismissed for abuse under the means test, then the debtor can file
a motion to extend the automatic stay by proving that the second
case is filed in good faith. 120 When the debtor establishes that the
second petition is filed in good faith, the stay is extended beyond
112 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 302, 119 Stat. 23, 75-77 (2005).
113 See James D. Key, The Advent of the Serial Chapter 11 Filing and Its
Implications, 8 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 248, 269 (1991); see also Noel S. Cohen,
Serial Chapter 11 Filings: Finding Method in the Madness, 17 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
461, 461 (2001).
114 Associated Press, Twinkies Maker Hostess Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, Wall St.
J., Associated Press, (Jan. 11, 2012, 6:08 PM) http://online.wsj.com/article/AP77feaO
5596234df88db14ee0d901ell4.html (demonstrating that Hostess filed bankruptcy
twice).
115 Trans World Airlines filed bankruptcy three times: 1992, 1995, 2001.
116 Trump Industries and Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts filed bankruptcy four
times.
117 U.S. Airways Chronology, USAIRWAYS.cOM, http://www.usairways.com/en-
US/aboutus/pressroom/history/chronology.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (showing
that U.S. Airways filed bankruptcy in 2002 and 2004).
118 Donald Woutat, Montgomery Ward Files for Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, July 8,
1997 at A10 (showing that Montgomery Ward filed initially in 1997). Montgomery
Ward filed a second petition in 2000. In re Montgomery Ward, LLC, Case No. 00-4667
(KG) 1748, 2007 WL 4322530, at *1 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (memorandum decision).
119 Key, supra note 113, at 248 ("[O]ne of the most controversial of these issues is
the propriety of reorganized debtors filing a second Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition.").
120 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2006). This section applies voluntary and involuntary
petition filings. Id.
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the thirty days. 121 The presumption is that the second petition
filing is not in good faith. A debtor may overcome the not-in-good-
faith presumption by a showing that he or she did not fail to file or
amend the petition or other documents, provide adequate
protection for a secured creditor, or perform the terms of a plan
confirmed. 122 A debtor also can overcome the not-in-good-faith
presumption by presenting "clear and convincing evidence" that
there has been a substantial change in his or her "financial or
personal affairs" and that the latter case will conclude with a
discharge or a confirmed plan.123
Section 362(c)(4) applies to "an individual" who files a
bankruptcy petition under Chapters 7, 11, or 13 and has two or
more pending cases before the bankruptcy court in the preceding
year that were similarly not dismissed for abuse under the Means
Test. If these factors are met, the automatic stay will not go into
effect when the debtor files the petition. Again the presumption of
not-in-good-faith prevents the automatic stay from going into
effect and protecting the debtor's property from the creditors. A
debtor may overcome the presumption by meeting similar criteria
established in section 362(c)(3).
In practice, the effects of these two provisions are overbroad.
Initially intended to curb serial filing abuses that were fairly
common under the 1978 Code, these new provisions are extremely
detrimental to individual debtors by creating a hostile bankruptcy
environment. 124 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission
("Commission") in 1994125 initially investigated the very specific
practices of serial filing in consumer cases involving secured
creditors with liens on real property. As mentioned above, the
Commission recommended a limited elimination of the automatic
stay for a real property foreclosure action when the individual
consumer had a prior filing in the preceding 180 days. The
121 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B).
122 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)(I)-(II).
123 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)(III).
124 Perhaps the hostile environment is intended to act as a "keep out" sign on the
bankruptcy court house doors. See generally Mann, supra note 33; Coco, supra note 16.
125 President Clinton signed on October 22, 1994 the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 creating the Bankruptcy Review Commission. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4107 (1994).
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Commission recommended against a general elimination of the
automatic stay in repeat filer cases.
The Commission wrote that "the evidence still is not
sufficiently conclusive on the prevalence of [the] . . . causes of
refiling to warrant a drastic change in access [to the automatic
stay] when a more moderate approach would suffice."126 Senator
Howell Heflin expressed concern that an inflexible standard would
work as a hardship for honest individual debtors who have
legitimate reasons for dismissal and refiling.127 Reviewing the
reports of judges and scholars, the Commission was unable to
conclude that all repeat filing is abusive. Rather, "[p]arties file for
bankruptcy relief repeatedly for different reasons," including
employment changes, family crisis, persistent financial difficulties
resulting in inability to pay timely on the plan, lack of education
about the process, and heavy reaffirmed debt load. 128
Further, the Commission determined that repeat filing is
more a result of a debtor's moral compulsion to make payments to
creditors and optimism about future earnings and ability to pay
under a Chapter 13 plan than abuse.129 Misguided by these
beliefs, debtors attempt to make payments to creditors under a
plan, fail, and then attempt a second and third filing and plan
rather than file a Chapter 7 petition.130
Recognizing the complexity of repeat filing by individual
consumer debtors, the Commission recommended against a total
elimination of the automatic stay for the second and third cases in
the previous year.131 Rather, the Commission recommended that
"[a] debtor ... not be precluded from filing two petitions within a
six-year time frame. If a debtor sought bankruptcy relief for the
third time in six years . . . , within six months of the dismissal or
conversion of the second filing" the stay would not go into effect. 132
Ignoring the Commission's recommendation, Congress
codified through BAPCPA a drastic elimination of the automatic
126 NAT'L BANKR. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, BANKRuPTcY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
280 (1997) [hereinafter "NBRC Report"].
127 Id. at 280 n.370.
128 Id. at 276-78.
129 Id. at 277.
130 Id.
1a1 Id. at 281.
132 Id.
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stay for human debtors. Misguided in their attempts to eliminate
abuse in the bankruptcy system, the drafters targeted serial filers
generally without detailed consideration of specific fact
scenarios. 133 Exceeding the mandate of preventing abuse and
fraud, this general elimination of the automatic stay, together
with the addition of numerous new BAPCPA automatic dismissal
provisions in human debtor cases, creates invisible trap doors that
open and drop individual human debtors out of bankruptcy court
protections.
BAPCPA creates several circumstances in which a human
debtor's case is dismissed for actions not involving fraud or abuse.
As discussed above, the credit counseling requirement requires a
human debtor to obtain counseling or a waiver of the requirement
in the 180-day period before filing a bankruptcy petition. 134 If a
debtor fails to obtain counseling and file the certificate with the
bankruptcy court at the time of filing, the debtor's case is
automatically dismissed. 135
Further, BAPCPA section 316 created a new requirement
that if an individual debtor fails to file a list of creditors, a
schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and
expenditures, a statement of financial affairs, six months of
paycheck stubs, and a statement of any reasonably anticipated
increases in income, the petition shall be automatically
dismissed. 136 Also, an individual debtor's case is automatically
dismissed if the debtor fails to provide the trustee with a copy of
his or her filed federal tax return for the year prior to the petition
133 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 3-4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 91-92.
13 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2005) ("[An individual may not be a debtor under this title
unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the
petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing . . . that
outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling . . . ."); First Shore Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hudson, 352 B.R. 391, 394-95 (Bankr. D.Md. 2006)
(interpreting the new provision requiring debtors to obtain a credit briefing in the 180-
day period preceding the date of filing).
1s In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 700-09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Bankruptcy Judge
Stong addressing the consequences of a section 109(h) dismissal of the debtor's petition
and the impact of that dismissal on the debtor's subsequent filing and explaining that
such a dismissal results in a limitation on the automatic stay.).
136 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 316; 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).
318 [VOL. 83:2
2014] SWORDS, SHIELDS, AND SHACKLES 319
filing.13 7 None of these new provisions provides an exception for
attorney neglect or for the exercise of judicial discretion to avoid a
severe injustice to the "honest but unfortunate" human debtor. 138
Next, the automatic stay will terminate for a human debtor if
the Chapter 7 debtor fails to act to redeem or reaffirm secured
debt connected to personal property of the estate. 139 An
"individual debtor" must file a statement of intention stating
whether the debtor plans to retain, reaffirm, or surrender the
property within 30 days of filing the petition. The debtor must
perform according to the stated intention within 30 days of the
meeting of creditors. 140 If the human debtor fails to do either,
BAPCPA requires a termination of the automatic stay allowing a
secured creditor to seize the personal property. 141 Additionally, a
137 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 720; 11 U.S.C. § 521(e).
138 Mantas Valiunas, Anything But Automatic: Dismissal Under § 521, 28 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 231, 232-33 (2011)
Imagine Emma, a single mother who has been burdened by numerous bills,
child support, and a recent layoff from work. She has been living paycheck to
paycheck, and the current economic slump has not helped her situation.
Harassed by debt collectors every day and barely able to feed her children,
she decides to file for chapter 7 to get a fresh start through bankruptcy. She
attempted to compile all the necessary information as advised by her
attorney, but unfortunately her employer could not provide pay stubs for the
last week of her employment because a fire destroyed the business. Since her
paycheck was the same amount every week, her attorney extrapolated the
information for the last pay stub and provided it to the court. A few months
after filing, a creditor asked the court to provide an order stating that the
case has been automatically dismissed after forty-five days since Emma did
not provide all the information required by § 521. Emma's failure to provide
the last pay stub from her employer did not meet the requirements of § 521
and her case was automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day despite her
honest need for bankruptcy protection. Emma was an honest but unfortunate
debtor who filed her information in good faith but was denied bankruptcy
relief because of a minor technicality.
Id.
139 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 311; 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(A)&(B).
140 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 311; 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A)&(B).
141 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 311; see also Napoli, supra note 113, at 758. The
author discusses the varied interpretations of this new provision stating:
[T]wo divergent lines of case law developed. One line holds that a debtor who
is current on payments under the terms of his agreement with a creditor
holding a security interest in property of the estate may retain the property
and continue to make payments without either reaffirming the debt or
redeeming the property. The other line holds that, if a debtor wishes to retain
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creditor can request that the court issue an order confirming that
the automatic stay is terminated. 142
These new BAPCPA provisions for automatic dismissal,
paired with automatic termination of the automatic stay for
repeat filings, function to leave human debtors outside the
protection of the bankruptcy laws. Corporate debtors 143 do not lose
the protective shield of the automatic stay for repeat petition
filings in the prior year. There is no presumption of bad faith that
must be overcome by a corporate debtor to keep the automatic
stay in place. Individual human debtors are, therefore, at a
significant disadvantage and are subject to extreme financial
hardship with the automatic termination of the protective
shield.144
C. BAPCPA Swords: Strip Down or Cram Down
One powerful weapon available to debtors, both human and
corporate, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was an ability to
bifurcate an undersecured creditor's claim in Chapter 7, 11, and
13.145 Based on the categorization of claims as either secured or
unsecured, the Bankruptcy Code allows claims for a debt against
the debtor's estate to be bifurcated. In the case of an undersecured
creditor's claim, for example, the debt is separated and listed on
the schedules as a secured portion and an unsecured portion. The
secured portion of the claim is paid in full under any plan
proposed by a debtor, and the unsecured portion of the claim is
paid at the rate of other non-priority unsecured claims. This
property of the estate that is subject to a security interest, that debtor's only
choices . . . are to reaffirm [or] to redeem ....
Id.
142 11 U.S.C. § 362(j) (2005).
143 The Commission was concerned with concurrent repeat petition filings by small
businesses (not large corporations). It recommended an elimination of the automatic
stay in the second pending case. The Commission provided for relief from the
application of this provision if a debtor can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that: "(1) the new case has resulted from circumstances beyond the control of
the debtor not foreseeable at the time the first case was filed and (2) it is more likely
than not that it will confirm a feasible plan . . . within a reasonable time." NBRC
Report, supra note 129, at 649. This recommendation was adopted by the drafters of
BAPCPA. It is now found at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(21).
144 Napoli, supra note 113, at 785.
145 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2005).
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enables individual debtors to keep needed collateral at a reduced
rate-lower than the contract-and to pay the debt over a longer
period of time. The bifurcation and allocation of the debt as
partially secured and partially unsecured is a powerful weapon for
a debtor.
After the enactment of BAPCPA, the ability of a human
debtor to bifurcate a secured claim under a Chapter 13 plan was
severely limited by the language of the hanging paragraph found
at the end of Bankruptcy Code section 1325.146 Section 1325
provides that section 506 shall not apply to a secured claim in a
personal use automobile if the creditor holds a purchase money
security interest ("PMSI") acquired within a 910-day period
preceding the date of the petition filing. 147 If the four required
elements of this new section are met-(1) part of a secured
creditor's interest is unsecured; (2) the creditor's interest
originates from a purchase money loan; (3) the vehicle was
purchased in the 910-day period before a bankruptcy petition
filing; and (4) the vehicle was purchased for a debtor's personal
use-a debtor's ability to apply section 506 to the obligation is
eliminated.
The hanging paragraph, also referred to as the "anti-
cramdown" provision of BAPCPA, destroys a pre-BAPCPA
mechanism that afforded consumer debtors the ability to keep
needed collateral at a reduced rate and to pay the debt over a
146 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 306(b). Section 306(b) adds a new paragraph to
section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code specifying that Bankruptcy Code section 506
does not apply to a debt incurred within the two and one-half year period preceding the
filing of the bankruptcy case if the debt is secured by a purchase money security
interest in a motor vehicle acquired for the personal use of the debtor within 910 days
preceding the filing of the petition. Id. Where the collateral consists of any other type of
property having value, section 306(b) provides that section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code
does not apply if the debt was incurred during the one-year period preceding the filing
of the bankruptcy case. Id.
14 See U.C.C. § 9-107 (2005)
A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that it
is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
Id. Most states in the U.S. have adopted a variation of this definition in their
commercial codes.
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longer period of time. This mechanism to eliminate an unsecured
portion of a lien against property remains available, however, to
corporate persons regardless of the length and timing of the
contracting obligation and bankruptcy filing. The corporate person
also continues to have other valuable legal weapons in the
bankruptcy process unavailable to human debtors.
Corporations enjoy a statutory presumption to DIP status in
a Chapter 11, a right entirely unavailable to the human debtor. 148
A DIP, through officers and managers, retains possession of all
estate assets and decision-making authority. Predicated on an
extremely limited court-created business judgment rule, the
corporate person continues to make day-to-day business operating
decisions and transactions, manages and controls the bankruptcy
estate, and drafts and proposes a reorganization plan.
In addition, corporate persons in bankruptcy have the power
to rewrite binding contracts. A corporate person is able to select
which executory contracts it will accept and continue to perform,
and those it will reject. 149 This power releases a corporate person
from undesired agreements such as union contracts or collective
bargaining contracts. For example, a corporate person can reject
the terms and confines of the agreement for set wage increases,
benefits, and pension contributions and plans. This power forces
unions back into negotiations with the corporate debtor with the
only likely result being a reduction of wages and benefits for
employees. This sweeping power to assume or reject unperformed
contracts in bankruptcy gives the corporate debtor unparalleled
leverage in the reorganization process. Indeed, due to their
possession of the remarkable ability to rewrite traditional contract
law, corporate persons have the ability to lien strip an
undersecured creditor in a reorganization plan.
148 "[D]ebtor in possession' means debtor except when a person that has qualified
under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1)
(2005). This section establishes a corporate person as both the debtor and the trustee in
the bankruptcy process. Id. The DIP would only lose this power in the rare instances of
mismanagement or fraud in which an independent trustee is appointed under section
1104. The DIP approach is the norm in the bankruptcy process for corporate persons.
49 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2005); 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2) (2005).
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CONCLUSION
John Courson, as the CEO of the Mortgage Bankruptcy
Association, ("MBA") encouraged homeowners to honor their
contractual debt even if it was not in their economic interest,
while the trade group quietly abandoned its glass facade, a 10-
story headquarters building in Washington D.C. 150 MBA found
itself underwater with its lender PNC Financial Services Group in
the 2007 market crash.15' By 2010, MBA decided to shirk its
financial obligation selling the $79 million property to CoStar
Group for $41 million leaving their previous lender holding the
deficiency.152 Representatives and commentators regarded the
decisions as a simple failure of business judgment rather than a
flaw in the moral character of the officers and managers.153
Individual consumers, on the other hand, are disciplined and
punished as they attempt to walk away from their contractual
obligations and file bankruptcy.154
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code lock in the
governance forms of disciplining neo-liberalism by creating new
legal shackles and at the same time providing fewer legal
protections and limiting the powers of the natural person in the
bankruptcy process. At the time in U.S. history when individual
consumers needed the most protections-the 2008 financial
crisis-individual human debtors received less protection. In
contrast, BAPCPA did not significantly alter the protections,
rights, or powers of the corporate debtor in the U. S. Bankruptcy
Code. If policy and legal shift need to occur, the focus should be on
corporate persons. Entities such as Enron, Worldcom, Lehman
Brothers, and Chrysler should be closely scrutinized. The social
15o James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Bankers Association Sells Headquarters at Big





154 H.R. REP. No. 109-31 at 3-4, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 91-92. BAPCPA
was enacted to "improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system [by forcing debtors to pay their
contractual obligations]." Id. H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I) explains that filing bankruptcy is
stealing for the individual consumer.
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and economic impacts of large corporation's financial behaviors
are far greater than individual financial behaviors.
The shifts in the bankruptcy laws reflect a disposition to
protect private wealth at the expense of individual consumers and
the collective. Neoliberal models fail to recognize that the health
of this country's economy has always depended on the free flow of
money and the movement of credit. Money must move to generate
wealth. As the largest segment of the population, the middle class
has traditionally been the engine driving the economy with its
purchasing power. While servicing burdensome debts in various
forms, the middle class is precluded from the wealth creation
process. The cumulative debt load or crushing debt overhang from
interlocking debt structures will absorb the future incomes of
consumers and prevent them from engaging in the economy. This
will detract from economic growth. Future income used to pay old
debts means less money circulating the economy. The flow of
money is truncated and the velocity of capital slowed.
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